ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Polemical Interaction Between Darwin And Mivart: A Lesson On Refuting Objections

• by: Anna Carolina Regner - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Brazil

Charles Darwin and George Mivart once engaged in a famous polemic concerning the origin of species. I will analyze this polemic in the light of the conceptual framework and argumentative strategies of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1872)[i] and Mivart’s On the Genesis of Species (1871). In order to understand the nature of their polemic, I will compare the problems they intended to deal with, their answers as well as their motivations, presuppositions, arguments, and argumentative strategies. In particular, I will focus on Mivart’s objections and Darwin’s responses as part of their argumentative strategies.I will treat refutation in its widest sense (without reducing it to merely proving falsehood) as a collection of procedures to challenge an opponent’s position or proposition.

1. Problems
1.1 Darwin’s problem
What is the subject of Origin of Species? If one looks at the table of contents, the Origin covers all the branches of Natural History in order to answer the central question: how are species produced in Nature? The Origin is a narrative which, by pulling together a great variety of threads, weaves a web whose purpose is clearly expressed in the Introduction: in dealing with the “origin of species”, it is not enough to conclude that the various species were not created independently. It is necessary to show how species originate from one another. This question appears in several forms (Darwin 1875, chapter III, p. 48-9): How are species produced in Nature? How do co-adaptations take place? How do varieties become good species? How are genera, groups, and sub-groups formed?

1.2 Mivart’s problem
The purpose of On the Genesis of Species is to find a path which reconciles apparently opposing scientific, philosophical, and religious views. Mivart’s main concern is how to reconcile evolution and theology. In order to answer this question, he first has to remove what he sees as “a few misconceptions and mutual misunderstandings which oppose harmonious action” (Mivart 1871, p.15), and to attack a theory of evolution which clashes with his own religious views. The Darwinian theory of Natural Selection is his main target, but he also attacks Herbert Spencer and Alfred R. Wallace’s views on ethical or moral questions (Darwin’s Descent of Man and Expressions and Emotions in Man and Animals had not yet been published).

2. Answers
2.1 Darwin’s answer
From the very beginning of his long narrative, Darwin’s guiding answer is:
“… I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive, means of modification.” (Darwin, 1875, Introduction, p. 2).

The central role played by the Principle of Natural Selection in Darwin’s theory can be seen in its “definitions”:
“I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient” (C.Darwin, 1875, p.49.).

“This preservation of favorable individual differences and variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest” (Darwin, 1875, p.63).

“… Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly ready for action, and is immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art” (Darwin, 1875, p.49).

“Nature, if I may be allowed to personify the natural preservation or the survival of the fittest, cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they are useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects for his own good: Nature only for that of the being which she tends” (Darwin, 1875, p.65). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Normativity Of The Progymnasmata Exercises

• by: Anders Sigrell - Umeå University

The last four years I have been involved in a research project concerning ancient rhetorical exercises and contemporary education. In this paper I will try to conclude some of the results that possibly could have bearing for our argumentative pedagogy. This paper claims the ancient rhetorical preliminary exercises, called progymnasmata, could help us in our endeavour to provide students with a suitable set of analysing tools and a wide range of efficient language choices (copia). Furthermore it is claimed that the exercises are normative in the sense that the exercises deal with the question whether an argumentation is a good argumentation, i.e. should it be allowed to guide our attitudes and actions?

1. Rhetorical exercises
Rhetorical exercises have throughout the history been used for teaching argumentation. Rhetoric is an old art; so is the art of teaching rhetoric. During the Hellenistic era, when Greek culture dominated the Eastern Mediterranean region, a need for a formalistic educational program evolved. It was given the name enkyklios paidea, i.e., “comprehensive education” (we recognize in the Greek the origin of our term “encyclopaedia”). The art of rhetoric became an essential, perhaps the essential part of enkyklios paidea. The rhetorical training was soon organized according to a set of distinguished exercises, progymnasmata.
It is a series of progressive, interdependent exercises of increasing complexity, with each new exercise building on prior skills while introducing students to new ones. They are “preliminary” in the sense that they provided a foundation for understanding a comprehensive system of rhetorical theory and practice, including the three traditional types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative, and epideictic), rhetoric’s five traditional parts, and stylistic ornamentation (figures of thought and speech). The initial exercises consisted of paraphrasing, imitating, and amplifying myths, fables, stories, anecdotes, and proverbs; the intermediate ones developed skills related to refutation and confirmation, commonplace, encomium, comparison, personification, and description; and the final assignments were compositions on theses and law proposals.
The exercises led the student from simple translations and paraphrases to more elaborate ones, and eventually to the development of original compositions responding to a particular source or situation.
It is truly intriguing to see the increasing interest in the ancient rhetorical exercises progymnasmata. Ten years ago hardly anyone had heard about progymnasmata. Today a simple web-search will generate 100.000 hits. At most conferences on rhetorical or argumentation pedagogy you will find sections or panels on progymnasmata. There is no longer any reason to talk about a neglected interest in the exercises.

2. Argumentation pedagogy
What are the goals of our argumentation pedagogy? From one point of view it could be said to help us to a higher degree act according to our intentions, and to a higher degree hold opinions in line with our believes. Even if there rarely are any theoretical considerations why these exercises might do the job, such considerations are inherent in the exercises. It is assumed that an attempt to extract the theoretical considerations behind the exercises might teach us something vital for today’s argumentative teaching.
There are a number of axioms for my research. One is that we are completely free to choose what language to use in argumentation. This fundamental axiom stems from the recognition of the arbitrary relationship between language and reality, that there is no forcing logical relation between language and what it denotes. In rhetorical theory this is captured in the distinction between res and verba – the distinction between reality and the language we are obliged to use to be able to think about and reflect over this reality.
From a contemporary argumentation pedagogical as well as epistemological view this distinction and necessary union between language and reality, form and content, might be the focal point for argumentation pedagogy. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Theorizing Visual Argumentation: Three Approaches To Jacob Riis

• by: Bruce E. Gronbeck - The University of Iowa, USA

One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph of Napoleon’s youngest brother, Jerome, taken in 1852. And I realized then, with an amazement I have not been able to lessen since: ‘I am looking at eyes that looked at the Emperor’ (Barthes 1981, p. 3).

In the opening paragraphs of Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes at first seems transfixed by the space between the image captured on a photograph’s surface and the materiality of the photograph itself, yet as he treats that conundrum, he begins to understand that he first must come to terms with his own subjectivity. He must wrestle with his subjective relationships to the objects of photographs, the events-being-photographed, and, indeed, the vision – the subjectivity – of the photographer. Barthes could aestheticize the arts and artists of photography, yet knew that he had more than an artistic relationship with the subjects within the frame, even the world from which they came. He was looking at the Jerome’s eyes, eyes that had looked at the Emperor himself more than a century before. He, Roland Barthes, was sharing mid-nineteenth-century French life, thanks to Jerome’s vision.

Barthes’ reactions to the photo of Jerome parallels in attitude and description Ansel Adams’ reactions to Jacob Riis’s photographs of late nineteenth-century New York City slum life:
These people live again for you in the print – as intensely as when their images were captured on the old dry plates of ninety years ago…. I think that I have an explanation for their compelling power. It is because in viewing these prints I find myself identified with the people photographed. I am walking in their alleys, standing in their rooms and sheds and workshops, looking in and out of their windows. And they in turn seem to be aware of me. (Alland 1974, p. 6)

And so Adams, writing a preface to the first coffee table art book compilation of Riis’s pictures, decontextualizes the photos and yet throws himself into a communicative relationship with the people being photographed.

Both Roland Barthes and Ansel Adams raise important questions about photography in particular and mechanically, chemically, and electronically reproduced visuality more generally. Why are our relationships to visual images so varied and disorganized? In what ways do the contexts within which we view pictures affect our relationships with them? And, for students of argument theory, why does the place of pictures in discursive arguments vary from theorist to theorist? For example, to Gronbeck (1995), they are essentially evidence, similar to Slade’s (2003) belief that they provide reasons for assent; Finnegan (2003) expands this approach, arguing that they are enthymematic and hence a part of the inferential machinery. To Shelley (1996), they are visual substitutions for verbal discourse, while to Hariman and Lucaites (2002), especially iconic pictures evoke their earlier discursive and hence argumentative contexts.

I wish to take a somewhat different position in this essay. I will argue that the place of photos – and other visual imaging technologies as well – in argumentative processes is in fact variable. The place of visual objects in argumentation depends upon those objects’ relationships to other oral and written, even performative, discursive processes. Pictures and other kinds of images have variable use within argumentation depending
(1) the approach taken by the disputant,
(2) material characteristics of the pictures themselves,
(3) the contexts within which the arguments are being framed, and
(4) the conceptualizations of pictures generally held by the disputant.

The roles of photos in argumentation, therefore, vary because of personal predilection or credibility, material representational technologies, the rhetorical situation, and even theories of visuality. Visual materials perform different kinds of jobs in argument because, I finally will argue, they exist and have force in webs of discourse, where their jobs depend largely on how they are conceived or understood. Ultimately, what a photograph is conceived to be directly affects what it does in human talk and decision making.
My title suggests that I will want to spend most of my time with that last point: the place of visual theory in explaining how images are employed argumentatively. I will treat the other three factors of variability briefly, however, as I first background Jacob Riis for those who do not know him and then talk about four stages through which his photos went in their journey from the 1890s to the present. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Reshaping Emperor Hirohito’s Persona: A Study Of Fragmented Arguments In Multiple Texts

• by: Tomohiro Kanke - Tokai University

1. Introduction
The Imperial Rescript on New Year’s Day of 1946 was Emperor Hirohito’s first formal address to the nation after his official speech of surrender in World War II on August 15. The Rescript is popularly known as his “Declaration of Humanity,” in which he renounced his divinity, the core of the war’s ideology. The Rescript was not broadcast; rather it appeared on the front page of newspapers nationwide. Appearing alongside were articles covering the Rescript, along with the Emperor and his family.
In this paper, I review how McGee’s (1990) Theory of Fragmentation of Text explains the interactions between multiple texts and how they establish a new, human persona for the Emperor by constructing a coherent understanding of the Rescript. I demonstrate that the Rescript itself played a minor role in shaping this persona, and that fragments of text found in the article complemented the Rescript and constructed the “Declaration of Humanity” as it is remembered by most Japanese people today. First, I discuss the historical background of the study, exploring the political imperatives for the creation of the Emperor’s new persona. Next, I analyze the arguments of the denial of divinity. I then discuss the differences between the original Japanese version of the Rescript and the official English translation. Next I address the argumentative characteristics in the Japanese Rescript and how they fail to redefine the ideology of the Emperor’s theocratic authoritarianism. Finally, I analyze the newspaper articles surrounding the Rescript and discuss how their contents complemented the Rescript, helping reshape the Emperor’s persona by defining his “Declaration of Humanity.”

2. Historical Background
Emperor Hirohito is one of the most important public figures in Japan’s modern history. Before and during the Pacific War, the Emperor was regarded as a living deity and his existence was used to justify Japanese ultra-nationalism and fascism (Dower, 1999, p. 277). The ideology stated that the Emperor was the direct descendent of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, the most sacred and highly-ranked god in Shinto, Japan’s indigenous religion (Dower, 1999, p. 277). Shinmin no michi (The Way of Subjects), a booklet issued by the Ministry of Education four months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, reinforced the ideology of the Emperor’s spirituality and supremacy. Shinmin (1974) states that the Imperial Throne is “coeval with Heaven and Earth” and that the Emperor is “the center” of all. Filial piety and loyalty to the Emperor are strongly emphasized. The pamphlet’s goal is to promote a selfless devotion to the state, a dedication to national defense, and a quest to realize the “Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” in the name of expanding the Emperor’s supreme rule. In order to achieve these ends, the Emperor’s “subjects” are taught to sacrifice even their lives for the sacred mission demanded by the Emperor. Dower (1999) writes that: “Emperor Hirohito was sacrosanct. His war was holy. The virtues he embodied were unique and immutable” (p. 277). This deified image of Emperor Hirohito had been created and maintained beginning with Japan’s push for modernization in 1868. The spiritual quality of his image peaked during the Second World War, due to the political need to unify the people and justify aggression.
After the end of the war (August 15, 1945), Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers, the United States in particular. The occupation policy was the “Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan.” This plan was approved by President Truman and sent to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). One of the fundamental objectives of the occupation stated in the “Basic Directive” was to bring about a democratic state in which individual liberty, freedom of speech, and, central to the topic of this paper, freedom of religion were guaranteed. Another objective was to disarm and demilitarize Japan so that it would not be a future threat to world peace (Takeda, 1988, p. 105).

The existence of the Emperor became a controversial issue, for his presence continued to signify Japanese militarization. There was intense debate as to whether an anti-democratic institution such as the Emperor system should be abolished. Takeda (1988) summarizes the abolitionists’ arguments as follows:
… the institution of the throne in Japan was a cornerstone or sheet-anchor of the imposition of absurd myths of the Emperor’s divine origin and of State Shinto. The emperor was regarded as having personified and perpetuated for the Japanese the myth of Japan’s racial predominance with her manifest destiny to rule the world, which naturally resulted in military aggression. (p. 8) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Adam Smith’s Ad Hominem: Eighteenth Century Insight Regarding The Role Of Character In Argument.

• by: Jack Russell Weinstein - University of North Dakota

1.
At the last ISSA conference, I argued that Adam Smith’s system of moral psychology contained an implicit account of reasoning that shared much in common with contemporary discussions in informal logic and critical thinking (Weinstein 2003a).[i] First, I argued that for Smith, emotions were, to a large degree, rational. He did not regard passion and reason in opposition to one another. Second, I investigated the place of audience in Smith’s argumentation theory, suggesting that his work anticipated much that is now associated with a rhetorical approach to informal logic and reasoning. Smith’s moral theory is built upon the interactions of actors and spectators.[ii] It necessitates the creation of an imaginary impartial spectator who plays the role of an observing and judging conscience. The relevance of rhetoric to such a theory should be obvious (Weinstein 2001, chapter two; McKenna 2006).
During this discussion, I encountered a question: to what extent does the reunification of passion and reason call certain informal fallacies into question? Obviously, if the two are not fundamentally separate as the Western philosophical tradition has often assumed, the so-called appeal to emotion, for example, may not necessarily be fallacious. For Smith, emotions supply essential information that directs moral actors to normative judgments; appealing to these sentiments is a necessary component of moral reasoning.[iii]

My concern in this paper, however, is not with the appeal to emotion but with the argumentum ad hominem, an investigation inspired by Smith’s comments in the classroom. During his lectures on rhetoric, Smith compares Shaftesbury’s writing to Jonathan Swift’s, arguing throughout that Swift’s clear and simple style is to be praised while Shaftesbury’s more ornate writing is the exemplar of poor prose. In the midst of his discussion, he claims:
Shaftesbury himself, by what we can learn from his Letters, seems to have been of a very puny and weakly constitution, always either under some disorder or in dread of falling into one. Such a habit of body is very much connected, nay almost continually attended by, a cast of mind in a good measure similar. Abstract reasoning and deep searches are too fatiguing for persons of this delicate frame. Their feableness of body as well as mind hinders them from engaging in the pursuits which generally engross the common sort of men. Love and Ambition are too violent in their emotions to find ground to work upon in such frames; where the passions are not very strong. The weakness of their appetites and passions hinders them from being carried away in the ordinary manner,… (LRBL 138 – 139).[iv]
This is not a circumstantial ad hominem; Smith is not suggesting that Shaftesbury is either hypocritical or contradictory. It is abusive. Smith is asserting that because Shaftesbury was either sickly or a hypochondriac that he was unable to engage in sophisticated and in-depth reasoning.
There are no doubt times when individuals are too sick to concentrate. Nevertheless, Smith’s remarks are about Shaftesbury’s constitution, not his circumstance, and are therefore a condemnation of his intellectual capacities in general. Rather than judging Shaftesbury on the merits of his philosophy, he condemns his work based on biographical facts; this appears to be as fallacious as they come. Therefore, the question I pose is whether or not Smith’s comment can be justified. Using his complex notion of moral reasoning as a model, I ask whether character is somehow related to argumentation, and if so, how they are connected. In short, this paper asks whether abusive argumentum ad hominem might not necessarily be fallacious at all.

2.
The history and origin of the ad hominem fallacy is currently in dispute. There is a decade-long disagreement as to whether the fallacy was first introduced by Locke, as is usually argued, or whether its traces can be found in Aristotle (Chichi 2002, Eemeren and Grotendorst 1993, Nuchelmans 1993, Walton 2004 and 2001) In either case, however, Smith would have been familiar with the relevant texts. He read and was heavily influenced by both philosophers, and there are both Lockean and Aristotelian elements throughout his books and lectures. Yet, there is no direct continuum connecting the two philosophers, at least in regards to Smith’s theory of argumentation. In fact, whereas many contemporary informal logicians seem themselves as returning to an Aristotelian framework, Smith regards a rejection of formalism as moving away from Aristotle while finding himself more in line with Locke. Although Smith’s first academic appointment was the Chair of Logic at Glasgow University, he chose to teach rhetoric instead of the Analytics or similar systems of logic. Syllogistics were, according to Smith, an “artificial method of reasoning” (Ross 1995, p. 110). John Millar, Smith’s student tells us that according to Smith:
The best method of explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts and speech, and from an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion and entertainment. By these arts, everything we perceive or feel, every operation of our minds, is expressed and delineated in such a manner, that it may be clearly distinguished and remembered’(Stewart 1980, 1.16). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Management Of The Burden Of Proof And Its Implications For The Analysis Of Qualified Standpoints: The Case Of Evaluative Adverbials

• by: Assimakis Tseronis - LUCL, Leiden University

1. Introduction
In this paper, I seek to answer two interrelated questions:
a) what argumentatively relevant information can we draw from the use of stance adverbials when they qualify the utterance that is to be reconstructed as a standpoint?
b) How can we make use of it in the analysis and evaluation of the argumentative discourse in which the qualified standpoint appears?

I start from the theoretical premises of the pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004, van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2000, 2002a), which considers both the normative and the descriptive aspects of argumentative discourse and acknowledges both the dialectical and the rhetorical aims that arguers have when engaging in argumentative discussions. In answer to the first question, I introduce the concept of the management of the burden of proof as a normative assumption about the choices at the protagonist’s disposal regarding the qualification of a standpoint. In answer to the second question, I look at evaluative adverbials, in particular, and discuss how considering them as one of the ways in which a standpoint can be qualified contributes to the analysis of the argumentative discourse. Before elaborating on the answers to these two questions, I briefly present the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation and discuss how the qualification of standpoints is to be understood. In the last section of the paper, by way of illustration, I analyse a short fragment of argumentative discourse, in which the standpoint is qualified by an evaluative adverbial.

2. The theoretical framework
Pragma-dialectics (henceforth referred to as PD) proposes a systematic and comprehensive study of argumentative discourse as a verbal, rational and social activity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). The aim of the pragma-dialectical approach is to evaluate ordinary language users’ argumentation as it occurs in written or spoken communication by appealing to standards of critical reasonableness. To this end, an ideal model of a critical discussion has been developed, which is the theoretical construct that serves as the lens through which argumentative reality is interpreted, analysed and eventually evaluated.
The ideal model of a critical discussion is conceived as a dialogue between two parties, who perform the asymmetrical roles of protagonist and antagonist of the standpoint. The antagonist casts doubt on the standpoint and subsequently on the arguments in support of it, while the protagonist adduces arguments in response to the antagonist’s challenges. The path to the resolution of the dispute ideally goes through four stages: confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stage. A number of procedural rules, inspired by Popper’s critical rationalism and in line with a dialectical approach to argumentation describe which moves may be performed by each party and which not, and at which point throughout the dispute resolution process (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004).
The model serves a heuristic function for the analysis of argumentative discourse in the sense that it specifies the argumentatively relevant elements that the analyst should look for in argumentative reality or extract from it for that matter. It also serves a critical function in the evaluation of argumentative discourse. When mapping the reconstructed discussion on the ideal discussion, all those moves that were made while they should not have been made and those that were not made while they should have are considered as an obstruction to the goal of reaching a resolution to the dispute and thereby identified as fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992).

In order to reconstruct argumentative discourse (whether spoken or written) in terms of the ideal model of a critical discussion, PD treats it as a dialogue (explicit or implicit) and attributes to the parties involved in it the joint goal of coordinating their moves in order to critically test the tenability of a standpoint. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a) in a series of articles argue that an integration of rhetorical insights in the pragma-dialectical framework can benefit the analysis by providing a better understanding of argumentative reality. In the light of what is termed strategic manoeuvring, PD acknowledges that the parties, when fulfilling their respective roles and contributing their moves to the dispute resolution process, do not only observe the dialectical standards set by the procedural rules of the discussion but also try to make the best of what is allowed for each of them at the various stages of the discussion. In this integrated view:
– The antagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by casting doubt on the arguments in support of it but also in having the other party retract the standpoint as a result of the testing procedure.
– The protagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by adducing arguments in support of it but also in having the other party retract the doubt as a result of the testing procedure. Read more