ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Proto-Regress Argument Schemas

• by: Jan Willem Wieland - Ghent University

1. Two cases
Consider the following two examples of a regress argument.
First example. In discussing what to do about his unreliable wife, Juvenal (1st-2nd century CE) thought hiring guardians would not be a good idea:
But who will guard the guardians? In posing the famous question, the Roman author, Juvenal, was suggesting that wives cannot be trusted, and keeping them under guard is not a solution – because the guards cannot be trusted either. (Hurwicz 2008, p. 577, cf. Juvenal, Satire 6)

Second example. Sorensen addresses the issue whether the following principle holds:
(Access) For any action x, you are obliged to do x only if you can know that you are obliged to do x.

On first sight, this is plausible. Access does not say that we actually have to know our obligations in order to have them, but it is only required that it is possible to know them. By contraposition, Access entails that if you cannot know that you are obliged to do x, then you are not obliged to do x. Yet, a consequence of this is:
(Access*) For any action x, if you eliminate your possibility to know whether you are obliged to do x, then you eliminate your (possible) obligation do x.

Here is the example. I am obliged to donate some of my inheritance to charity only if I can know that I am obliged to donate. So, if I cannot know that I am obliged to donate, I am not obliged to donate. So, if I burn the will before reading whether I am obliged to donate, then (assuming the will was my only access) I eliminate my obligation to donate. In general, the Access principle might be used to get rid of one’s obligations, namely by eliminating one’s possibility to know them (Sider 1995: 277-9). To block such options, a proponent of Access might suggest:
(Block) For any action x, you are obliged not to make it impossible to know whether you are obliged to do x. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Russian National Identity As Argument Construction An Assessment Of Political Transformations In Post-Soviet Russia

• by: David Cratis Williams - Florida Atlantic University, Marilyn J. Young - Florida State University & Michael K. Launer - Florida State University

Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson suggested in their 1994 report for Cambridge Energy Research Associates that this year, 2010, is a significant moment for assessing political transformations in post-Soviet Russia. They chose the year 2010 because, in their words, it “will have been exactly twenty-five years since Gorbachev came to power, starting the process that led to the new Russian revolution. By then, multiple transitions will be very far along and many of the uncertainties will be resolved. And, of critical importance, by then a wholly new, post-Communist generation will be active in Russian life” (Yergin and Gustafson 1995, p. 108). In this paper[i], we accept Yergin and Gustafson’s invitation to use 2010 as a vantage point for reflection upon the post-Soviet political transformations in Russia and the subsequent Russian search for a new political and social identity. Consistent with their approach, we take a macro-view in our assessment of both political and identity transformations, focusing not on individual texts but rather broad trends substantiated through analysis of selected discourse examples drawn from leaders, the media, and other analysts.

1. Political Transformations in Post-Soviet Russia
In 1994, Young, Launer, and Fetissenko argued that the Chernobyl nuclear accident opened argumentative space that ultimately led to the downfall of the USSR. In 1993, Williams, Young, and Elliott argued that Russia needed to develop a “culture of communication” in order to effect democratic reform. That culture of communication never developed, and lies stillborn inside the Kremlin walls. The argumentative space that appeared so promising in the early 90s has nearly closed as dissent is suppressed and media outlets are closed or taken over by government agencies. One might ask, “What happened?” Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Building A Trustful Audience In Scam Letters

• by: Galia Yanoshevsky - Bar-Ilan University

Advance fee Fraud letters or as they are also known ‘Nigerian 419 Scam letters’ are named after the section of the Nigerian penal code that addresses them. They usually involve a person pretending to have access to a vast sum of money that he or she needs help to get out of the country. In return for access to their bank accounts or other services, the addressee is promised huge cuts of the ‘proceeds’. Often, the victim is asked to fork out send hundreds of dollars up front – and then thousands – to cover the bribes, administrative costs, and other fees that are said to be required before the money can be moved out of the country. Of course the money never materializes (Brady 2003). Whereas in the past initial contacts were made via mass-mailings, hand deliveries or fax machines, today Nigerian scam letters are sent via email.

Advance fee Fraud letters are an intriguing problem to argumentation studies. Since they appeal to the reader’s empathy and infer to the character of both speaker and audience, they clearly represent a case of what Danblon dubs following Perelman “rhetorical persuasion” (Perelman 1988/1989; Danblon 2004). And because their objective is to defraud the recipient, we can say that we deal here with rhetorical manipulation. Their interest for argumentation studies stems from the fact, that despite their obvious dubiousness, they actually seem to work. Statistics are vague, but show that out of the millions of letters sent each year by email across the world, 1-2% of the receivers actually engage in “business” with the sender and send in personal details and money (Dillon 2008). Moreover, though one is tempted regard those who fall for the letters as gullible, data shows that many of the victims are nevertheless highly educated.Moreover,those who fall prey to investment or fund fraud are often established in the business world. In the study undertaken by Corpeleijn (2008), the majority of the victims (80%) worked in academia, the corporate world, government or education (Schoenmakers et al. 2009). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Use And Misuse Of Topoi: Critical Discourse Analysis And Discourse-Historical Approach

• by: Igor Ž. Žagar - Educational Research Institute Ljubljana & University of Maribor Slovenia

1. Introduction
The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), pioneered by Ruth Wodak (see Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart 1999; Wodak & van Dijk 2000; Wodak & Chilton 2005; Wodak & Meyer 2006; Wodak 2009), is one of the major branches of critical discourse analysis (CDA). In its own (programmatic) view, it embraces at least three interconnected aspects (Wodak 2006, p. 65)[i]:

1.’Text or discourse immanent critique’ aims at discovering internal or discourse-internal structures
2. The ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ is concerned with the demystifying exposure of the possibly persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices.
3. Prognostic critique contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication.

CDA, in Wodak’s view (ibid.),
is not concerned with evaluating what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. CDA … should try to make choices at each point in the research itself, and should make these choices transparent[ii]. It should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others.
One of the methodical ways for critical discourse analysts to minimize the risk of being biased is to follow the principle of triangulation. Thus one of the most salient distinguishing features of the DHA is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Ad Hominem In The Criticisms Of Expert Argumentation

• by: Maria Załęska - University of Warsaw

1. Introduction
This paper offers a theoretical framework for describing the structure of arguments directed against epistemic authority. The interest of the previous studies concentrates mainly on the argumentations presented by the expert and on the argument ex auctoritate (Walton 1997). In this paper a different question is addressed, namely the structure of arguments directed against the expert’s arguments. A specialist’s reputation that can grant him the status of an epistemic authority depends on two factors, i.e. on what he actually argues and how the recipients react to his arguments. The reaction is direct when a recipient refutes an argument in a discussion with the author, and indirect when a recipient discusses these arguments with other persons, not with the author. Since reputation and refutation are strictly connected (Dascal 2001) negative reactions may contribute to the erosion of expert’s status of authority.

The expert is treated as a kind of personal warrant of the quality of arguments he formulates during his professional activity. Indeed, he has got a name and personal recognizability thanks to the quality of his argumentations in professional settings. Therefore, refutation of his argumentations may take a form of criticisms directly against him in his social function of a personal epistemic warrant. Such criticisms may even adopt the form of ad hominem, when some personal characteristics of the expert are introduced as premises of arguments against his arguments. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Appeal For Transcendence: A Possible Response To Cases Of Deep Disagreement

• by: David Zarefsky - Northwestern University

1. The emphasis on agreement
It is almost a truism in argumentation studies that productive disagreement must be grounded in agreement. Shared understandings of the goal, shared commitment to particular procedures, and shared adherence to basic truth-claims are thought to be necessary in order for arguers to engage each other rather than to talk past each other. Among the many writers who offer some version of this postulate are Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 65), who say, “The unfolding as well as the starting point of the argumentation presuppose indeed the agreement of the audience. … from start to finish, analysis of argumentation is concerned with what is supposed to be accepted by the audience.” In a similar vein, Ehninger (1958: 28) wrote, “Debate is not a species of conflict but of co-operation. Debaters … co-operate in the process of submitting a proposition to rigorous tests. … They believe … not so firmly that they are unwilling to put their convictions to a severe test and to abide by the decision of another concerning them.” These underlying beliefs about purpose and mode of procedure are agreed to by all disputants. Brockriede (1975: 182), identifying indicators of argumentation, includes among them “a frame of reference shared optimally.” Argument is pointless, he suggests, if two people share too much in their underlying presuppositions, but it is impossible if they share too little.  And MacIntyre (1984: 8) notes the impossibility of reasoning with one another when there are no shared standards to undergird rational talk. These are only four representative examples. Read more