ISSA Proceedings 2002 – God, Man, Universe

• by: Prof.dr. Valeri Dinev - Sofia University

Different emotions and passions are gradually formed in man deriving from his simultaneous relation with God and the Universe. The phenomenon of fear, for instance, is in a state of constant growing in the course of hundreds of years, reaching at present considerable heights. This fear comes from God, as well as from the Universe. In relation to both these factors, Man seems small and vulnerable. This calls for philosophical anthropology to consider the influence of God and the Universe on Man, because to a certain extent Man is God’s creation and part of the Universe, being its crown. God creates Man and creates the Universe. Man, being created together with the tangible world, becomes its dominator. Therefore, Man’s function is to rule the world. Although Man is closely connected with the tangible world, his likeness is only with God, encompassing at the same time the confirmation of absolute impossibility for Man to be reduced to the ‘world’. Following Berdiaeff, “Man is a go-between God and Himself”[i]. To a certain extent God is what Man needs, He inspires him, and leads him in the infinite existence of the Universe. This is when God possesses us and seeks the deepest nooks in our souls. “God reveals Himself within me, within the last depth of ‘myself’ – or I reveal myself to Him in that last depth”[ii]. This mutual penetration allows God to talk through Man, and Man to strive to be like his Creator. This does not imply that Man becomes God, but this inner relation between God and Man will always be there, notwithstanding that there have been deep incongruities with which Man has had to live. For instance, the transition between ‘initial innocence’ to the ‘original sin’ places man in a state, differing considerably from his previous one. And breaking the prohibition of the Creator brings it about. Until he has tasted the forbidden fruit, Man is outside the bounds of knowing good or bad. Breaking the prohibition, Man finds himself in a new situation and from this moment on he is in a state of corrupted existence.  These two states are very important from the pint of view of philosophical anthropology, since they mark a new turning point of the human essence. Man is torn between the memory of the lost paradise and the feeling of guilt and sin. From his close uniformity with God to his breaking away Man loses his peace of mind. Just as Fromm says: “Paradise has been lost forever. Man is alone in the world – a stranger who find himself in a boundless and wrought with menaces reality. The new freedom inevitably engenders a deep feeling of insecurity, powerlessness, doubt, loneliness, anxiety. He has to rid himself of this feeling in order to succeed in life”[iii].

In a way, Man becomes free, takes his fate in his own hands. But the feeling of sin does not leave him. Some anthropologists hold the view that with the knowledge or rather the differentiation between good and bad we could have delineated the boundaries of our morale. We could say that the original sin makes us not only free, but also turns us into moralists[iv]. According to Berdyaev, the myth of the original sin not only degrades, but enlightens Man, because his ‘spirit’ comes to the fore. But a spirit, born in fear, rooted in the original sin.
As a result, Man experiences a duality. On the one hand, the feeling of guilt, on the other, the feeling of freedom, and third, the feeling of fear. Man starts building himself in the conditions he is now, but his relation with God never dies. Although they lay the foundations of a new morale, God’s commandments still occupy an essential place in the relation God-Man. “Thou shall not commit adultery” “He, who has looked at a woman with desire, has already committed adultery in his heart”[v].   We find here not only an ethical, but also an anthropological element, since man carries in his heart both the desire and the shame[vi].  With lust comes shame. While lust dominates over the body, the shame takes hold of our soul. A battle for supremacy between the two ensues not in both an ethical and anthropological perspective, since the issue of body/soul is fundamental to philosophical anthropology. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Logical Fallacies, Dialectical Transgressions, Rhetorical Sins, And Other Failures Of Rationality In Argumentation

• by: Daniel H. Cohen - Colby College, Waterville, Maine

Introduction [i]
When does Preaching to the Choir become Beating a Dead Horse? Is it ever wrong to argue – making Picking a Fight a fallacy? Could it be a fallacy not to argue – the fallacy of Wrongful Silence? If audiences are elements of arguments, is there a class of Audience Fallacies? [ii] Quibbling and Nitpicking, Interrupting and Turning a Deaf Ear, as well as Arguing Out of Turn, Arguing Out of Place, and Arguing Out of Order are all bad things to do in argumentation. Do they all deserve the name “fallacy”?
Arguments are more than just sequences of inferences, so we should not limit our thinking about bad arguments to just those that include bad inferences. Arguments include arguers, and there are more ways for arguers to go wrong than simply to make bad inferences. And arguments include audiences, whose presence creates further chances for problematic argumentation. Argument analysis requires more than the toolbox of logical fallacies generally provides.
The task I am undertaking here is outlining a new taxonomy of errors in arguments, to include not just logical missteps – fallacies – but also rhetorical and dialectical mistakes. The organizing principle refers to the norms that are violated, norms that are associated with the three dominant conceptions – metaphors or models or paradigms, as you prefer – for arguments. A second task, subsequent to the first and approached only tentatively here, is completing the picture by the raising the possibility of a new model.

1 Fallacies, Proofs, and Arguments
Following what has been taken (perhaps mistakenly) to be Aristotle’s lead, logicians have generally been content to provide catalogues of fallacies for use in argument analysis. These lists of errors have too often been regarded as something of a sidecar to the main business of investigating, characterizing, and justifying good arguments. They provide little in the way of a serious theoretical framework for thinking about all of arguments’ failures.
One problem with a simple list of fallacies is that without any theory it is just a list. There is no organization, no consensus on the fallacies to include, and no closure. It is a collection of facts rather than a body of science; it affords mere knowledge rather than genuine wisdom. Fallacies are added to the list at the whim of the logician writing the text (a prerogative I will indulge in myself in due course). And therein lies another part of the problem: it has been logicians writing the texts. Lists of fallacies have been limited from the outset to logical flaws in argumentation. If we use the term “fallacy” more generically for any flaw in an argument, then the point can be put this way: not all fallacies are logical ones. And, we should note with a little surprise but a lot of emphasis, not all logical fallacies – i.e., not all deductively invalid inference patterns – are necessarily fallacious.
The ideal for good arguments against which fallacies have been defined is that of the mathematical proof – but not all arguments are proofs! Two other important models or “root metaphors” [iii] that reflect our practice and inform our thinking about arguments arguments have already been noted – argumentation-as-war and arguing-as-presenting-a-case. Together, these three paradigms provide a more comprehensive structure for theorizing about bad arguments.
They create more space in our theories for the full range of problems that bedevil arguments. In so doing they point to some curious omissions from the traditional lists, notably the sins (for lack of a better word) of arguing when one should not and failing to argue when one positively should. Another model is needed to fill that gap. Argumentation needs to be thought of as a form of interpersonal engagement. At its worst, it is merely aggressive socializing, but at its best, it is an expression of civic character. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Inventional Capacity

• by: Dale Hample - Western Illinois University

Inventional capacity refers to the size of one’s stock of available arguments in a given situation. The elements in one’s repertoire are generated in one of three ways: the argument is directly recalled from memory, or it is recalled and then edited to adapt it to the immediate circumstance, or it is completely invented from whole cloth (Waldron 1990). Arguments that are made public, first exist cognitively (Hample 1985).
The main task of this paper is to summarize a number of recent unpublished experiments that offer information about inventional capacity. Before doing so, however, perhaps a brief description of the importance of this idea in both classical rhetorical theory and contemporary message production theory might be in order.

1. Theoretical Background
This is surely not the place to trace the whole history of invention in rhetorical theory, and I am not the person to do it anyway. Instead, let me begin with some focused attention on a single passage from Cicero’s Topica.
That book was written in response to repeated requests by Trebatius, a protégé of Cicero’s who acted as liaison between Cicero and Caesar. Trebatius found Aristotle’s Topics in Cicero’s library, but wished to have a more readable account because Cicero had assured him that “. . .these books contained a system developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments so that we might come upon them by a rational system without wandering about. . . .” (Topica, I. 2). This sets the stage for the points I wish to make. For Cicero, invention is systematic, rational, and efficient. It is something done on purpose, done by study.
Soon thereafter comes the passage I wish to reflect upon. The substantive beginning of the book is this: “Every systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches, one concerned with invention of arguments and the other with judgment of their validity. . . .” (Topica, II. 6). Cicero credits the Stoics and their writings on dialectic with having made great contributions to the second branch, judgment. Aristotle and his topoi, however, are Cicero’s main source of inspiration regarding invention. Some of these topoi are intrinsic, and include the whole, the parts, the meaning, and those things closely connected to the thesis. Extrinsic topoi are, of course, external to the nature of the subject, and mainly involve proof by authority (XIX. 72 – XX. 78).
This is an important theoretical statement about argumentation. Cicero clearly distinguishes between the generation of possible arguments and the testing of them, and that distinction is at the heart of this research program. I depart from Cicero in detail, however, and wish briefly to say why.

The first branch of Ciceronian argumentation is invention, which consists mainly of the topoi. The topical systems have always struck me as post facto and unhelpful to the creative process. Given enough time to prepare, one might make constructive use of the topoi. But in the moment, one may simply have to argue, and circumstances do not often permit time to work through the lists of topoi.
Actually, Cicero shows some sensitivity to this hesitation in another work. In De Oratore the participants debate whether or not rhetoric is an art. Crassus makes this comment: “If however the actual things noticed in the practice and conduct of speaking have been heeded and recorded by men of skill and experience, if they have been defined in terms, illuminated by classification, and distributed under subdivisions – and I see that it has been possible to do this – I do not understand why this should not be regarded as an art. . . .” (I. 109). This displays my own understanding: that the topoi and other rules are after the fact, things noticed in the practice of successful orators. Though substantial energy invested in working through the lists of topoi and stases could produce some good inventions, I am doubtful that even those carefully trained in classical rhetoric do this very often. I think they mainly just argue.
The second part of argumentation is judgment. Arguments can certainly be tested dialectically, but this is the only method Cicero has in mind. This seems overly restrictive, for two reasons. First, dialectic is solely concerned with rational testing, and other factors (e.g., politeness) are also reasonable tests of an argument. Second, dialectic is inherently public, and always involves two or more people. This misses the private approximations to dialectic that a single person might construct in thinking through an argument prior to utterance.
So the merit I find in Cicero is the sharp distinction between invention and judgment, and the recognition that these are the two aspects of argumentation. My objection to what he says on both heads is the same, that his descriptions are too unnatural to describe what people actually do. More useful material is found in recent theories of message production. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Argumentative Traits In Older Adults: An Exploratory Study

• by: Brooks F. Haynie - Adams State College, Department of Communication & Jean E. Kubeck, Adams State College - Department of Psychology

Literature on Older Adults and Argumentative Traits

1. Communication and the Life-span Perspective
Scholars are increasingly interested in the communication characteristics of older adults. As Nussbaum, Hummert, Williams, and Harwood (1996) explained, “Perhaps the best reflection of this growth may be seen in the recent special issues of journals dedicated solely to communication and aging, such as have appeared in Communication Research, Language and Communication, Ageing and Society, Journal of Ageing Studies, International Journal of Aging and Human Development, and… Health Communication” (2-3). Furthermore, older adults’ communication patterns have been studied in several important domains including cognition, language, and interpersonal/social relationships.
Simple demographic data suggest that this interest is certainly warranted given the increasing average age of the populace. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001), 12.4% of the current population is 65 years of age or older. The number of older Americans is expected to double to about 70 million by the year 2030. By sheer number, the older adult population is formidable and deserves study.
Nonetheless, researchers have noted the lack of a unifying perspective in which to study communication in older adults. “Communication scholars, on the other hand, have typically not accounted for life-span developmental changes in their various ‘mainstream’ theories of the communicative process” (Nussbaum, et al 1996: 2). Since communication patterns may change through life (Coupland & Nussbaum 1993; Nussbaum 1989), there is a definite need to identify and understand the various communication characteristics as people grow older.
Although the life-span perspective envelops several assumptions, two deserve emphasis for this review (Baltes, 1987). First, all periods of the life-span are important for comprehending behavior patterns. No one period in a person’s life is more important than another. Over reliance on data or theories from one period of life at the expense of another undermines a life-span perspective. Second, both change and stability can be observed as people age. “Our task is to document all such changes and aim for understandings that transcend age boundaries to achieve theories of life-span cognitive development” (Nussbaum, et al 1996: 38). Developing theories about human behavior can be problematic when there is a general tendency to conduct research using primarily college students. Even when different age groups are included in research (either as an actual age variable or as a correlate to age), researchers infrequently discuss age differences or conduct longitudinal studies to investigate how a given behavior may change over time.
When this perspective is applied to communication, research suggests that lifelong communication patterns may indeed be on an equal footing with genetics in predicting longevity (Friedman, Tucker, Schwartz, Tomlinson-Keasey, Martin, Wingard, & Criqui 1995). Increasing communication scholarship from the life-span perspective will enrich our knowledge base. As Nussbaum and colleagues (1996) concluded, “Communication scholars are in a rather unique position to join with other scholars to provide a much richer explanation of the aging process” (39).

2. Argumentativeness/Verbal Aggressiveness
Many studies have looked at the personality variables of argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness. Argumentativeness is one’s tendency to attack the position of others, while verbal aggression is one’s tendency to attack the self-concept of others (Infante & Rancer 1982). Much of this research has centered on argumentativeness theory, which seeks to explain which personality and environmental variables are likely to influence argumentative or verbally aggressive messages.
While early research noted a negative correlation between an individual’s levels of argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness (i.e., Infante & Wigley 1986), most research now shows either no correlation or a weak positive correlation between these variables. As Infante and Rancer (1996) explained, “Because argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness are situated in different, independent dimensions of personality (extroversion and neuroticism, respectively), it is expected that the two traits are not related. Thus, high, moderate, and low argumentatives are equally likely to be high verbal aggressives” (323).
However, in a comprehensive meta-analysis involving 12 studies and 3,397 subjects, Hamilton and Mineo (2002) reported a slight positive correlation of  0.16. They concluded that “[t]he meta-analyses reported here do not support the original optimism regarding the projected social effects of decreasing verbal aggressiveness by increasing argumentativeness. The results indicated that the effect of argumentativeness on verbal aggression is positive and moderately small” (309). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Paul’s Argumentation In Galatians 3.6-14

• by: M.Th. Mr Mika Hietanen - Åbo Akademi, Åbo, Finland

Abstract
Gal. 3.6-14 is one of many passages in the letters of Paul which is difficult because of the argumentation it contains. An argumentation analysis is therefore called for to disentangle the arguments and to recover any implicit premisses. Such an analysis gives a more complete picture of Paul’s argumentation and helps us understand and evaluate it. The analysis indicates that Paul is attempting to convince both through logical argumentation and through an argumentative strategy using arguments by appeal to tradition and to authority. The argumentation is at times, strictly speaking, fallacious. It is suggested that a neutral and transparent argumentation analysis using a contemporary approach is a fruitful preliminary step in the exegesis of Pauline argumentative texts.

Text of analysis (Paul’s Letter to the Galatians 3.6-14)
3.6 Just as Abraham ‘believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness,’ 3.7 so, you see, those who believe are the descendants of Abraham. 3.8 And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, declared the gospel beforehand to Abraham, saying, ‘All the Gentiles shall be blessed in you.’ 3.9 For this reason, those who believe are blessed with Abraham who believed. 3.10 For all who rely on the works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who does not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law.’ 3.11 Now it is evident that no one is justified before God by the law; for ‘The one who is righteous will live by faith.’ 3.12 But the law does not rest on faith; on the contrary, ‘Whoever does the works of the law will live by them.’ 3.13 Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us – for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’ – 3.14 in order that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith. [Revised Standard Version Bible: Catholic Edition, copyright 1989, 1993, Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.]

1. Introduction
The pericope of 3.6-14 in Paul’s letter to the Galatians is among the most argument-rich passages in the New Testament. Although examined many times, few have undertaken a basic argumentation analysis of the passage. It has been argued that Paul’s reasoning does not pay much attention to the logic of argumentation, that it is based mainly on persuasion through rhetoric and use of authority. In several passages, however, the argumentation gives the impression of being based predominantly on logical arguments. Gal. 3.6-14 is such a passage and should therefore be useful as a test case for a modern argumentation analysis. My expectation is that such an analysis is useful as one of the initial steps of an exegesis. Section 3.6-14 stands at the beginning of what is often described as the argumentative section of Galatians, chapters 3-4. Verses 3.6-14 deal with two of the main themes in these chapters: Abraham’s faith and function as a role model and the Christian as being not under the law but in Christ. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Relative Persuasiveness Of Anecdotal, Statistical, Causal And Expert Evidence

• by: Hans Hoeken & Lettica Hustinx - University of Nijmegen

1. Introduction
Argument quality plays an important role in popular models of the persuasion process, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1987). According to these models, argument quality determines the outcome of the persuasion process if people are motivated and able to scrutinize the message. McGuire (2000) notes that given the importance of argument quality for persuasion, remarkably little research has been done that addresses the question whether the strength of arguments is related to the type of warrant or type of evidence that is used. In this paper, we try to contribute to answering this question.

1.1 Arguments in persuasive documents: the importance of probability and desirability
Persuasive documents are often designed to influence people’s behavior: to quit smoking, to drink less, or to buy a Volkswagen beetle. The usually implicit claim is that the propagated behavior, for instance, quitting smoking, is better than the alternative behavior (continuing to smoke, drink heavily, or buy another make of car). Claims about the (relative) favorableness of an option are often backed up by pragmatic argumentation (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans et al., 1996, 111-112). In this type of argumentation, the claim is supported by referring to the favorable consequences that acceptance of the claim will have. For instance, as a result of no longer smoking, it is argued that your chances of dying of lung cancer or of a heart attack are reduced, your physical condition improves, and your breath smells fresher.
Crucial to the persuasiveness of this type of argumentation is that the audience accepts the desirability of the consequences and that it regards it as plausible that the propagated behavior will indeed lead to these consequences. A strong argument in favor of such a claim would be that the behavior very probably will result in a very desirable consequence. A strong argument against such a claim would be that the behavior will very probably result in a very undesirable consequence. If the audience does not readily accept the consequence’s probability or desirability, you have to provide evidence to back up your claim.
The audience may doubt a consequence’s desirability as well as its probability. Areni and Lutz (1988) claim that assessing a consequence’s desirability is easier than assessing a consequence’s probability. For instance, people may find it hard to assess the probability of a new heating system lowering heating costs while it is easy for them to assess the desirability of a cost reduction. Therefore, you would expect to encounter evidence in support of a probability claim more often than evidence in support of a desirability claim.
This expectation is supported by Schellens and De Jong’s study (2000). They analyzed the occurrence of evidence in twenty Dutch Public Service Announcement documents. With respect to evidence supporting desirability they conclude that the desirability of certain consequences (e.g. self-assurance, cheerfulness) has to speak for itself and no evidence is provided (or necessary). In this paper, we focus on the evidence that can be provided to support probability claims. Read more