ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Management Of The Burden Of Proof And Its Implications For The Analysis Of Qualified Standpoints: The Case Of Evaluative Adverbials

• by: Assimakis Tseronis - LUCL, Leiden University

1. Introduction
In this paper, I seek to answer two interrelated questions:
a) what argumentatively relevant information can we draw from the use of stance adverbials when they qualify the utterance that is to be reconstructed as a standpoint?
b) How can we make use of it in the analysis and evaluation of the argumentative discourse in which the qualified standpoint appears?

I start from the theoretical premises of the pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004, van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2000, 2002a), which considers both the normative and the descriptive aspects of argumentative discourse and acknowledges both the dialectical and the rhetorical aims that arguers have when engaging in argumentative discussions. In answer to the first question, I introduce the concept of the management of the burden of proof as a normative assumption about the choices at the protagonist’s disposal regarding the qualification of a standpoint. In answer to the second question, I look at evaluative adverbials, in particular, and discuss how considering them as one of the ways in which a standpoint can be qualified contributes to the analysis of the argumentative discourse. Before elaborating on the answers to these two questions, I briefly present the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation and discuss how the qualification of standpoints is to be understood. In the last section of the paper, by way of illustration, I analyse a short fragment of argumentative discourse, in which the standpoint is qualified by an evaluative adverbial.

2. The theoretical framework
Pragma-dialectics (henceforth referred to as PD) proposes a systematic and comprehensive study of argumentative discourse as a verbal, rational and social activity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). The aim of the pragma-dialectical approach is to evaluate ordinary language users’ argumentation as it occurs in written or spoken communication by appealing to standards of critical reasonableness. To this end, an ideal model of a critical discussion has been developed, which is the theoretical construct that serves as the lens through which argumentative reality is interpreted, analysed and eventually evaluated.
The ideal model of a critical discussion is conceived as a dialogue between two parties, who perform the asymmetrical roles of protagonist and antagonist of the standpoint. The antagonist casts doubt on the standpoint and subsequently on the arguments in support of it, while the protagonist adduces arguments in response to the antagonist’s challenges. The path to the resolution of the dispute ideally goes through four stages: confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stage. A number of procedural rules, inspired by Popper’s critical rationalism and in line with a dialectical approach to argumentation describe which moves may be performed by each party and which not, and at which point throughout the dispute resolution process (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004).
The model serves a heuristic function for the analysis of argumentative discourse in the sense that it specifies the argumentatively relevant elements that the analyst should look for in argumentative reality or extract from it for that matter. It also serves a critical function in the evaluation of argumentative discourse. When mapping the reconstructed discussion on the ideal discussion, all those moves that were made while they should not have been made and those that were not made while they should have are considered as an obstruction to the goal of reaching a resolution to the dispute and thereby identified as fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992).

In order to reconstruct argumentative discourse (whether spoken or written) in terms of the ideal model of a critical discussion, PD treats it as a dialogue (explicit or implicit) and attributes to the parties involved in it the joint goal of coordinating their moves in order to critically test the tenability of a standpoint. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a) in a series of articles argue that an integration of rhetorical insights in the pragma-dialectical framework can benefit the analysis by providing a better understanding of argumentative reality. In the light of what is termed strategic manoeuvring, PD acknowledges that the parties, when fulfilling their respective roles and contributing their moves to the dispute resolution process, do not only observe the dialectical standards set by the procedural rules of the discussion but also try to make the best of what is allowed for each of them at the various stages of the discussion. In this integrated view:
– The antagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by casting doubt on the arguments in support of it but also in having the other party retract the standpoint as a result of the testing procedure.
– The protagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by adducing arguments in support of it but also in having the other party retract the doubt as a result of the testing procedure. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Prime Minister Mori’s Controversial “Divine Nation” Remarks: A Case Study Of Japanese Political Communication Strategies

• by: Hiroko Okuda - Nanzan University

The 2000 general election was of great significance because it would decide the direction Japan was to take in the twenty-first century. Prior to the general election, on the funeral day of his predecessor, Obuchi Keizo, Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro made a toast at a party of the pro-Shinto parliamentary organization. In his speech, Mori described Japan as a “divine nation,” and sparked controversy across the country. To play to the pro-Shinto religious side, Mori did not just magnify Japan’s pride and self-regard, but also intensified the sentiment of its national identity by calling in Japanese cultural uniqueness (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).[ii] For his pro-Shinto audience, Mori’s cultural assertiveness and defiance was a common sense support for the traditional values of Japanese society. To the public ear, however, the strong-sounding words sounded very conservative. Mori’s pronouncement adversely affected public trust both in his cabinet and in his leadership of the ruling coalition consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), new Komeito, and the newly-born Conservative Party. Controversy over his “private” remarks at the party spread from the political sphere to the public sphere. Troubled by the emotional trauma of loss for more than a half century after World War II, many Japanese people questioned his capacity as the Prime Minister.[iii] Following a decade of dissatisfaction with empty promises of administrative reform in the 1990s, public cynicism now seemed to run so deep that public desire for strong leadership appeared to seek even authoritarian alternatives.
In this paper[i], I observe the social, political, and historical context in which the nationwide backlash against Mori’s calling Japan “divine” circulated in concert with a particular mood that was influencing opinion polls. Observations of the contexts of his “divine nation” remarks will provide a more realistic picture of the two-fold quality of Japanese polity, in which everything has a front “tatemae,” the pretense designed for public acceptance (i.e., de jure) and a back “honne,” the actual intent of the private self “I” (i.e., de facto). For that purpose, I would explicate first how the news reported his “private” remarks and questioned his genuine intent, and then examine how Mori attempted to defend the controversial phrase “divine nation” by shifting the issue from his “mistake” of advocating Shinto religious ideas to the public’s “misunderstanding” of his remarks. This includes his implicit, but strong censure of the news media that made his private comments public. Mori’s strategic approach to publicly explaining his questionable remarks failed, but the sympathy vote for Obuchi saved him from having to resign.
Prior to examining the controversy, I explain the context in which Mori was attacked by the opposition parties and the general public for having “hawkish” views.

1. The Context
Mori’s toast, delivered on May 15, 2000, at a party held by the Shinto Seiji Renmei parliamentary league (consisted of pro-Shinto Diet members) at Hotel New Otani in Tokyo, was extemporaneous. Its purpose was to pay tribute to those Shinto priests who for a long time had supported the LDP members in their respective electoral constituencies.[iv] In his toast, Mori called Japan the “nation of the kami centered on the emperor”: “I would like people to acknowledge that Japan is the divine nation with the Emperor at its center. Everything we have done in the last 30 years has been done with that in mind.”[v] In front of Shinto leaders and pro-Shinto lawmakers, he made a respectful gesture toward Shinto religious ideology. By creating a friendly atmosphere among his immediate political associates, Mori sought to strengthen his relations with Shinto LDP supporters for the 2000 general election.[vi] Here he ignored the importance of making a clear distinction between his public obligation as Prime Minister and private matters. Especially, his choice of Shinto religious terminology exposed his particular political views to public scrutiny. To the public, his yearning for Japan’s prowess under a divine Emperor appeared to have troubling echoes of Imperial Japanese military power and its devastating results. On the whole, Mori’s “private” remarks ended up being reported in political news coverage, and then criticized by opposition leaders as well as subjected to negative national attention.

Prime Minister Mori’s description of Japan as a “divine nation with the Emperor at its center” caused a series of political and public attacks on his personality. At first, he overlooked the political and public backlash against his “divine nation” remarks. His belated response missed an opportune time to mute growing consciousness-raising as well as to restore his image of ineptness played up in the news coverage. The growing criticism affected his initiative in keeping the tripartite ruling coalition united. The leaders of New Komeito and the Conservative Party, Kanzaki Takanori and Ogi Chikage, publicly expressed their concern that the Prime Minister’s choice of language might have an adverse effect on the election, and even on their political alliance. Prior to his formal apology delivered on May 19, 2000, Mori privately apologized to the leaders of those two coalition partners for his “mistaken” performance that caused the political fiasco.[vii] Both of the leaders accepted his explanation along with his pledge to be more careful not to offend anyone holding different political views (Mori sets June 25 poll amid resignation calls 2000).[viii]
Even members of his cabinet voiced misgivings and puzzlement about Mori’s mishandling of the situation. Implicitly Chief Cabinet Secretary Aoki admitted that Mori’s remarks were indiscreet, saying that the Prime Minister should have been more careful about the choice of language in his capacity as the nation’s top political figure.[ix] Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Dynamics Of Right-Wing Populist Argumentation In Austria

• by: Martin Reisigl - University of Vienna

Right-wing populist argumentation is best analysed within the framework of a transdisciplinarian, politolinguistic approach that connects concepts of political science, argumentation theory and critical discourse analysis. In the following, this claim will be justified and exemplified with a selective analysis of right-wing populist argumentation in Austria. I will especially focus on the question of how populist argumentation articulated by members of an opposition party differs from populist argumentation verbalised by members of a governing party.[i]

1. The concept of populism
There are many different proposals as to the meaning of the political fighting word “populism”. To mention just a few of them:
The German political scientist Dieter Nohlen (1998, p. 514f.) distinguishes among three different meanings of the word.
(1) First, “populism” denotes – according to Nohlen – a politics that is either judged negatively or positively.
(2) Second, Nohlen speaks of “populism” in terms of a social-political movement that concentrates on masses of people on the one side and on single politicians as leaders on the other side. The concentration on the appeal to masses here often relates to nationalism. If this is the case, we are faced with so-called “national populism”.
(3) Third, Nohlen conceives “populism” as a political strategy of mobilisation and unification.

The positive evaluation of the word is especially advocated by those who promote populism, who see themselves as populists; in Austria for example by Jörg Haider, who has repeatedly and proudly adorned himself with this predicate, as one can see in example 1, 2 and 3.

(1) “In case of doubt we have put a limit on the presumptuousness of the powerful and have strengthened the back of the citizens. Although the ruling class has never forgiven us for this, the people has thanked us for this by supporting us. Our politics has thus thoughtlessly and condescendingly been denounced for being populist. But whatever.
Populism is nothing but a politics that is obliged to the people. Very unlike the politics of the rulers in the ivory tower, who like so much to speak of the ‘people out there’, in order to also express their distance from the people. With respect to the ruling class, one has often the impression that one’s own people is a nuisance to the powerful and often stands in their way. But the citizens are not willing to be permanently abused as applauding and approving scenery. Also the citizens in the former German Democratic Republic have finally scanned every week during big demonstrations: “We are the people!” (Haider in his speech “On the state of the Republic and the situation of the FPÖ”, November 12, 1999; the German original is quoted in Reisigl 2002, p. 154)

(2) “For this we [= the FPÖ, M.R.] have gotten the reproach for populism, and we consider this to be definitely honourable. The people must be heard and taken seriously in a democracy! Issuing of orders coming from the ivory tower of the ruling class, whose contempt for the common people thus becomes visible, have nothing in common with a system of freedom. But especially state-political responsibility should demand to take seriously the worries and anxieties of the people and to keep away in good time dangers and threats by political action.” (Haider 1994, p. 57; the German original is quoted in Reisigl 2005, p. 64)

(3) “Populism is readily used as a swearword for politicians close to the people whose success consists of raising their voice for the citizens and in suiting their mood. Thus, I felt this designation always as an honour. We live in a mediatised democracy. Where much democracy is written on, there is, in reality, mostly very little democracy in it. For this reason the citizens who do not belong to the ruling class and their society need reliable advocates of their interests. I always considered this as my role.” (Haider in Worm 2005, p. 9; the German original is quoted in Reisigl 2005, p. 64) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Ad Verecundiam Fallacy And Appeals To Expert Testimony

• by: Michael J. Shaffer - St. Cloud State University

1. Introduction.
Much recent work in epistemology focuses on the role of testimony in generating warranted beliefs. One of the main views about this topic is known as non-reductivism. This view involves the idea that warrant by appeal to (expert) testimony does not involve inductive reasons that support belief in the reliability of the source in question. Tyler Burge’s particular version of this view (Burge 1993) is based on an a priori principle that all testimony is (at least defeasibly) probative, even to the degree that will sometimes qualify those sorts of beliefs as knowledge. Moreover, on Burge’s view, the kind of warrant that this principle imparts on certain beliefs is externalist in nature and so in forming warranted beliefs on the basis of testimony it is neither necessary that a believer know that the source of that testimony is reliable nor is it necessary that the believer know of and/or understand the (a priori) principle that Burge claims is sufficient often to warrant those beliefs. Finally, such warrant is supposed to be a priori in nature. In this paper it is argued that Burge’s view fails to provide resources sufficient to make an adequate distinction between fallacious ad verecundiam appeals to authority and legitimate appeals to authority and so Burge’s epistemology of testimony is deficient in this respect.

2. Ad verecundiam arguments.
The standard approach to the informal fallacies is to treat them as sorts of deficient arguments, most often as deficient deductive arguments. In line with this idea, ad verecundiam arguments have been most often understood to have the following sort of form (A1):

P1. A states that p is true.
P2. A is not an expert with respect to p.
C1. p is true.

Similarly, legitimate appeals to expert testimony are supposed to have the following form (A2)[i]:

P3. A states that p is true.
P4. A is an expert with respect to p.
C2. p is true.

Ad verecumdiam arguments would then seem to be best defined as invalid deductive inferences that involve appeals to inappropriate authority or appeals to the testimony of non-experts. What is epistemically important about A2-type inferences is that, when valid, they are justification preserving, and so if one is justified in accepting the premises then one is justified in accepting the conclusion. Recognition of this point highlights the error involved in A1-type inferences. Such inferences are bad because the premises do not support the conclusion such that were one justified in accepting the premises, then one would be justified in accepting the conclusion.
Of course there has been considerable debate about the adequacy of A1 as the proper analysis of appeals to inappropriate authority on a number of fronts, the two most important of which are (1) whether such arguments should be understood to be deductive in nature and (2) whether appeals to expert testimony are arguments at all (see Walton 1997, ch. 4). The first of these issues will not be addressed here, as it is largely tangential to the main point of this paper. However the second issue, the issue of whether or not fallacious and legitimate appeals to non-expert testimony are arguments is an important issue in the context of the general epistemic significance of appeals to authority. More specifically, the issue of whether appeals to expert testimony are arguments at all is an important for both the evaluation of the adequacy of certain epistemological approaches to testimony and for the evaluation of the adequacy of A1 and A2 as the standard analyses of the logical and epistemic features of appeals to authority. In any case, we can begin by noting a few things about the nature of quasi-formal treatments of fallacies that will ultimately be relevant to this discussion.
Recall that from the more or less standard perspective of informal logic A1 is supposed to be a formal, or more properly a quasi-formal, analysis of canonical examples of everyday inappropriate appeals to expert testimony that we often see exhibited in advertising and elsewhere in our epistemic exchanges. As such, A1 is supposed to represent an important and generic logical cum epistemic reconstruction of a kind of case of reasoning that fails to adequately justify belief in the conclusion. Again, this is supposed to be because the premises do not entail the conclusion. In this case this it is because P1 and P2 are supposed to fail to be relevant to the truth of C1. This is why ad verecundiam arguments are supposed to be a species of the fallacies of relevance and so are typically reconstructed as a kind of deficient argument.

Given this general understanding, the more or less informal logical analysis of evidential appeals that is part and parcel of quasi-formal logic is simply a kind of epistemological reconstruction aimed at explicating the basic logical structure of garden-variety attempts to justify certain beliefs by appeal to reasons and simple logical rules. At this point, in order to make things a bit more clear and concrete, it will be useful to examine some detailed cases. So let us consider the following two wholly typical sorts of appeals to testimony where the bracketed information describes relevant contextual factors:

(E1) Gary Neville says that Amanita phalloides is deadly. [Gary Neville is a famous Manchester United defender and a member of the English national team].[ii]

(E2) Gary Lincoff says that Amanita phalloides is deadly. [Gary Lincoff is the author of Toxic and Hallucinogenic Mushroom Poisoning: A Handbook For Physicians and Mushroom Hunters. In that book it is explained that Amanita phalloides, the death cap, is deadly because it causes cyclopeptide poisoning which is characterized by the following gruesome pathology:

(i) A long latent period of up to 1 day between the ingestion of the mushrooms prior to the onset of the first symptoms;
(ii) The occurrence of diarrhea, abdominal cramps, nausea and vomiting;
(iii) A 1 day period of remission of the symptoms noted in (ii), followed by
(iv) possible liver and kidney failure, and consequent death] (1977). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 ~ Table Of Contents

Table of Contents ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Work in Progress

Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard & Bart Garssen – Preface
Mark A. Aakhus & Alena L. Vasilyeva – Managing Disagreement In Multiparty Deliberation
Donn P. Abbott – Modern Rhetoric And The End Of Argument
Andrew Aberdein – Virtue Argumentation
Theodora Achourioti  – Fallacies And Context-Dependence: Considering The Strategic Maneuvering Approach
Martin T. Adam – Classes Of Moral Agent And The Art Of Persuasion In The Pali Nikayas Jesús Alcolea-Banegas -Visual Arguments In Film
Jesús Alcolea-Banegas – Visual Arguments In Film
Habibe Aldağ & Ahmet Doğanay – The Effects Of Textual And Graphical-Textual Argumentation Software As Cognitive Tools On Development Of Argumentation skills
Donka Alexandrova – Agonistics Among The Wooden, Democratic And Monarchic Discourses In Contemporary Bulgaria
J. Francisco Álvarez – The Risk Of Arguing. From Persuasion To Dissuasion Rodica Amel  – The Challenging Force Of Dissuasion
Rodica Amel – The Challenging Force Of Dissuasion
Bilal Amjarso  – Addressing Anticipated Countermoves As A Form Of Strategic Manoeuvring
Corina Andone – The Strategic Use Of Antithesis In The Argumentation Stage Of A Critical Discussion
Kevin T. Baaske & Megan A. Baaske – Hurricane Katrina: An Argumentative Analysis Of Race And Gender Issues In The Media Coverage Of A Natural And National Disaster
Susan J. Balter-Reitz & Karen A. Stewart – A Perfect Circle: Visual Argument Field And The Definition Of The Middle Class
Hilde van Belle – When You Don’t Have Anything To Prove Strategic Manoeuvering And Rhetorical Argumentation
Lilian Bermejo Luque – The Justification Of  The Normative Nature Of Argumentation Theory
Barbara A. Biesecker – Memorializing In A Time Of Terror: A Case Study Of Public Argument
Frans A.J. Birrer – Hidden Obstructions In Discussions Involving Conductive Argumentation. Core And Surface In The U.S. Debate On The Use Of Data Mining Techniques In The Fight Against Terrorism
J. Anthony Blair – Investigations And The Critical Discussion Model
George Boger – A Foundational Principle Underlying Philosophy Of Argument
Åsa Brumark – Argumentation At The Swedish Family Dinner Table
Lilit Brutian – Arguments In Child Language
Andrew J. Burgess – Irony As Ethical Argumentation In Kierkegaard
Ann E. Burnette & Wayne L. Kraemer – The Argumentative Framework Of Imperial Righteousness: The War Discourse Of George W. Bush
Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet – The A Contrario Argument: A Scorekeeping Model
Linda Carozza – A Pragma-Dialectical Response To Feminist Concerns
Adelino Cattani – Rules Of Refutation And Strategies Of Dissuasion In Debate
Leah Ceccarelli – Creating Controversy About Science And Technology
Mathieu Chaput & Milton N. Campos – A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of Online Political Argumentation
Sara Cigada – Past-Oriented And Future-Oriented Emotions In Argumentation For Europe During The Fifties
Daniel H. Cohen – Understanding, Arguments, And Explanations: Cognitive Transformations And The Limits Of Argumentation
Elisia L. Cohen – Rhetoric, Homeland Security, And Geopolitical Context: A Comparative Argument Analysis After Terror Strikes
Catherine Ann Collins – Seeing Is Believing: The Visual Diary Of Paul Wynne
Peter A. Cramer – Controversy Participation As A Function Of Direct Reported Speech In News
Nathaniel I. Córdova – Between Radical Democracy And Civic Virtue: Political Piety And Public Moral Argument

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ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Grice’s Analysis Of Utterance-Meaning And Cicero’s Catilinarian Apostrophe

• by: Fred J. Kauffeld - Edgewood College

1. Introduction
This paper brings a critical analysis of Cicero’s “First Catilinarian” to bear on issues at the heart of Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning. Grice’s analysis affords a powerful model of how communicative norms can be pragmatically generated in human communication. However, the most defensible and, from the point of view of argumentation scholars, most interesting version of Grice’s analysis has been widely criticized as implausibly complex. Through study of Cicero’s use of apostrophe in his “First Catilinarian,” I will argue that the apparent complexity of Grice’s analysis lays bear the essential structure of seriously saying and meaning something and affords students of argumentation insight into the pragmatics of the commitments which speakers and addressees undertake. We will start with Grice and move to Cicero.

2. The complexity of Gricean speaker-intentions
Properly understood the pragmatics underlying Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning illuminate the strategic roles played by commitments and obligations in human communication, including the genesis and practical value of a speaker’s commitment to the truthfulness of what she says and to such probative obligations as she may incur. Introduced almost fifty years ago, Grice’s analysis affords insight into the essential components of the communicative act of seriously saying and meaning something.[i] Dennis Stampe has identified the practical calculation which speakers typically employ when performing that communicative act. According to Stampe, when a speaker says, e.g., that Uncle Bill has died, she openly and strategically takes responsibility for the veracity of her utterance. Accordingly, she makes herself inescapably vulnerable to criticism and resentment for mendacity should it turn out that she is speaking falsely. The speaker thereby generates a presumption of veracity on behalf of her utterance, which serves to provide her addressee with assurance that she is speaking truthfully. Given the speaker’s openly incurred commitments, her addressee can reason (ceteris paribus) and is intended to reason that the speaker would not be manifestly willing to risk criticism for speaking falsely, were she not in fact speaking truthfully (Kauffeld, 2001; Stampe, 1967; 1975).
This interpretation of the practical design underlying the constituents identified by Grice’s analysis is a model of normative pragmatics.[ii] It exhibits the genesis of a normative obligation in a familiar communicative practice: in saying that p, the speaker openly incurs an obligation to speak truthfully. And it identifies the potential efficacy of that normative obligation, viz., by openly incurring an obligation to speak truthfully, the speaker generates reason to, e. g., believe what she says. Moreover, variants of Stampe’s strategy for generating presumptions can be seen to be at work in the genesis of probative obligations in such speech acts as accusing, proposing, praising, etc. (Kauffeld, 1998; 2002).
However, Stampe’s account relies on a version of Grice’s analysis which many regard as implausibly complex. As Grice defended his analysis in the face of counter-examples, the conditions posited as necessary to seriously saying and meaning something grew in complexity. The version which informs Stampe’s account holds that it will be true that some speaker (S) means something by an utterance (u), if and only if S produces u with the following complex intention.

S’s primary sub-intention (I1): S intends1 that some addressee (A) respond (r) that p (or at least act as if S intends1 that A r that p);
S’s second sub-intention (I2): S intends2 that A recognize S’s primary sub-intention (or at least acts as if S intends2 that A recognize I1);
S’s third sub-intention (I3): S intends3 that A recognize S’s secondary sub-intention (or at least act as if S intends3 that A recognize I2); and
S’s fourth sub-intention (I4): S intends4 that A’s complex recognition of S’s intentions provide A with at least part of A’s reason for ring that p (or at least acts as if S were speaking with this intention) (Grice, 1969, pp. 154-157; Stampe, 1967; 1975; Strawson, 1964, pp. 439-460). Read more